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Abstract: Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication
before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of
equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale
for expecting Nash equilibria in general. This paper presents a plausible formal model of cheap
talk that distinguishes and resolves these possibilities. Players are assumed to have an unlimited
opportunity to send messages before playing an arbitrary game. Using an extension of fictitious play
beliefs, minimal assumptions are made concerning which messages about future actions are credible
and hence contribute to final beliefs. In this environment, it is shown that meaningful communication
among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency
then turns out to be a consequence of imposing optimality on the cheap talk portion of the extended
game. This finding contrasts with previous “babbling” results.
Keywords: strategic communication; two-stage games; pareto efficient equilibria; belief formation
1. Introduction
Self-enforcing agreements—those for that no party has any incentive to break given that all others
comply—should be carried out even if they are not binding in a formal sense. This is in fact the defining
characteristic of the standard Nash equilibrium concept, and thus, one of the common justifications for
this concept is that if players are allowed to communicate before playing a game, they could hardly
reasonably agree on an outcome not satisfying this criterion. Recall that a Nash equilibrium constitutes
for each player a set of strategies and beliefs (about other players’ strategies), such that the strategies
are the best responses to beliefs and the beliefs are correct (see e.g., Osborne 2004 [1]). We assume that
there is no recourse to court-enforceable contracting, or equivalently that any such interactions have
already taken place. Unfortunately, while intuitively pleasing, this justification for the use of a Nash
equilibrium has been characterized by a shortage of formal models.
On a related, but distinctly different track of reasoning, it is natural to wonder why agents would
ever agree on an inefficient outcome, assuming that they had the chance to talk in the first place.
In other words, why would players agree ahead of time to an inefficient outcome of a game if there
were another potential outcome, also an equilibrium, that gave strictly greater payoffs to all of them?
Once again, the challenge has lied in constructing a realistic, but necessarily simplified, formal model
of the agents’ communication process. Among other problems, this inefficient result appears to be
incompatible with the arguments outlined above, in which Nash equilibria in general are justified.
This type of preplay communication is often called cheap talk , which may be roughly defined as
nonbinding, nonpayoff relevant, preplay communication. Although cheap talk has indeed received
attention as a potential solution to these questions surrounding the equilibrium concept, in practice,
it has been mostly used in the study of signaling games, in repeated environments (often in connection
with learning), and in certain applied settings. These are of course all important applications, but these
leave the original ambiguities unresolved. This paper, then, returns to the goal of constructing a
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more comprehensive model of pure cheap talk and explores its relationship with equilibria and
equilibrium selection.
This paper develops a model of cheap talk that involves an unlimited communication session,
called a conversation , before the play of a standard game begins. Players announce in advance what
actions they plan to take in the upcoming game, and taken together, these announcements form one
possible prediction of what they may actually do. On the other hand, there is also a common prior
forecast, given exogenously, of what each player will do; this forecast is updated as the conversation
proceeds. An announcement is defined to be credible only if it is close to the best response to one
or the other of these two predictions about the rest of the players. Otherwise, an announcement has
no external justification, so it is deemed unbelievable and disregarded. The conversation continues
indefinitely in this manner, possibly, but not inexorably toward some limit. Realistically, it will rarely
if ever go on for very long (although, for complicated games, it may take some time), since if it is
going to converge, it will do so rapidly. However, it is important not to have an artificial limit imposed
externally, just as long finitely repeated games behave very differently than infinitely repeated games.
The paper’s first main result is that if the conversation converges toward a limit, then this
limit must be a Nash equilibrium of the underlying action game in which payoffs are determined.1
Conversely, any Nash Equilibrium forms a possible limit of the conversation. This result can be
interpreted as saying that meaningful communication before a game can only lead to Nash outcomes.
Since the cheap talk is the initial interaction between the players, we assume that they cannot be sure of
the strategies that their opponents will follow in the communication stage. Any strategy in this phase
that is weakly dominated by another is clearly not optimal; anything else is potentially the preferred
choice and is therefore, given the lack of information, one possible optimal choice.2 The paper’s
second result then states that optimal pregame play in the conversation stage leads to an efficient
outcome and that any efficient final outcome is a possible result of such a strategic conversation.3
This can be interpreted as saying that rational, or thoughtful, speech leads to efficiency. This completes
the connection between cheap talk (as modeled here, i.e., in an environment where rationality and
utilities are common knowledge), Nash equilibria, and Pareto optimality. The first result applies to all
games (at least those with a Nash equilibrium), while the second result only has bite in games with
multiple equilibria.
The conclusion derived from the second main result contrasts with previous “babbling” results,
in which it is impossible to select among the set of Nash equilibria because all pregame communication
is ignored. The main reason for the difference is that those previous studies looked for equilibria of the
extended communication game as a whole—for instance, by assuming that the full strategies of all
players are known. This allows equilibrium strategies in which no value is placed even on seemingly
mutually informative communication, whereas the model below presupposes the impossibility of
ignoring beneficial interchange. Thus, the present paper takes a more primitive view of pregame
strategies, especially since in part it is attempting to justify the equilibrium concept in the first place.
Naturally, although the model does not impose beliefs about the cheap talk stage, it still must make
some assumption about beliefs held upon entering the action game. Another approach that will destroy
the babbling equilibria is to assume an arbitrarily small, but positive cost to sending messages—this
is a restriction on the environment rather than on the structure of equilibrium or on belief formation.
While this limitation is plausible in reality, it is, strictly speaking, no longer a model of cheap talk, even if
the total sum spent on sending messages is always lower than the game’s smallest payoff differential.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of some of the relevant literature.
In Section 3, some motivation is given for the specific assumptions made in this conversational model
1 The limit is an ε-Nash equilibrium.
2 This is discussed in further detail in Section 3.
3 The notion of efficiency used here is stable efficiency, a concept that is equivalent to Pareto efficiency in generic two
person games.
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of cheap talk. Section 4 lays out the formal model, stating and proving the paper’s two main results.
Several examples are detailed in Section 5 in order to illustrate both the cheap talk process and the
implications of the theorems. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarizing the model and
discussing some possible extensions of its implications.
2. Previous Literature
The concept of cheap talk was introduced into the economics literature by Crawford and Sobel
(1982) and Farrell (1987) [2,3]. Since then, a sizable literature has developed related to this topic,
with such examples as Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Forges (1990), Farrell (1993), Aumann and Hart
(1993), Blume and Sobel (1995), and a survey in Farrell and Rabin (1996) [4–9]. The paper that perhaps
is closest to the present one is Rabin (1994) [10]. It models a finite instead of an infinite opportunity for
communication, but also seeks a notion of optimality rather than equilibrium in the analysis of the
extended game. The specific form of cheap talk assumed by Rabin is different from the one presented
below, in particular with respect to the element of choice between strategies against which to credibly
best respond. The results can be framed in terms of the two central questions posed here, but are
generally less conclusive in either. Both papers adhere to the full rationality paradigm of classical
game theory and previous work on cheap talk, as opposed to, say, the evolution literature.
There are a number of papers that study a more limited class of games. For instance,
Matsui (1991) [11] applied cheap talk to common interest games, and in this context, his notion
of cyclic stability yields efficiency. Canning (1997) [12] studied signaling games of common interest,
although the messages do not necessarily constitute cheap talk per se. He found that off-path beliefs
are vital to the question of whether or not efficiency is eventually realized; randomly drawn off-path
beliefs encourage experimentation and lead to efficiency. Finally, Sandroni (2000) [13] studied two
person repeated coordination games without cheap talk. He introduced the concept of blurry beliefs,
which is a less restrictive (that is, more fully rational) belief dynamic than those used in evolutionary
game theory, although it is stronger than anything used here. Sandroni showed that if the belief classes
of the players satisfy reciprocity, then cooperation will be achieved. Overall, the current paper pins
down the link between communication and (efficient) equilibrium outcomes more concretely than the
previous literature. In particular, it explores a specific empirically-consistent model of belief formation
and shows a two way equivalence between that process and the optimality of the resulting behaviors.
A fairly large class of papers has studied repeated games and the emergence of Nash equilibria
without introducing cheap talk, including Crawford and Haller (1990), Young (1993), and Kalai and
Lehrer (1993) [14–16]. Finally, there have been some experimental studies of communication and
equilibrium selection in various coordination games; see, for example,Cooper et al (1992), Brandts
and Cooper 125 (2007), and Cachon and Camerer (1996) [17–19]. The results can be summarized (and
oversimplified) as finding that two way pregame communication greatly increases the chances of
observing efficient equilibrium outcomes. Pertinently, this holds even if the efficient equilibrium is not
risk-dominant, in contradistinction to some previous results. Meanwhile, some experimental studies
found that preplay communication can actually induce fewer choices consistent with Nash equilibria,
e.g., Boulu-Reshef et al (2020) [20] in the context of public goods games. This could either be due to
the limited opportunity for communication and/or the possibility of social preferences (which would
change the set of NE).
3. Motivation
This section provides some intuition and justification for the structure of the model that follows;
the impatient reader can skip to the next section. The model assumes that there is an action game to be
played, about which the players are assumed to have full information (in order to abstract away from
any signaling incentives during the conversation). Each player begins with a common forecast about
what actions he or she will take in the upcoming game. These expectations can be interpreted as vague
initial ideas about how the game might be played, arising perhaps from societal conventions or from
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focal points (hence the assumption that the forecasts are common and known). They are not beliefs in
the formal sense, although they will be updated throughout the conversation.4 Since a priori, nothing
can be absolutely ruled out by any of the players, the prior forecasts are totally mixed.5 Needless to
say, the forecasts are not in any way binding: players ignore what they themselves are “expected”
to do, although they can take into account the influence this expectation has on their opponents.6
The key distinction between forecasts and standard beliefs is that the forecasts are about the general
environment (how might this game typically be played by others?), whereas beliefs are about the
actual decisions by the specific players interacting in a given concrete situation. Thus, among other
implications, it makes sense to reason about players trying to influence the beliefs that their opponents
have about them, whereas they cannot influence the more broadly prevalent forecasts. Of course,
then, we need to model from whence the forecasts come (social norms, news media, evolutionary
psychology, etc), but that is outside the scope of the present paper.
During the conversation stage, before playing the action game, players send public messages to
each other. Since we are attempting to understand what such preplay communication can achieve,
we assume that there is an unlimited (but countable) opportunity to send these messages. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, the messages are taken simply to be announcements of a player’s
own expected actions in the game. One could assume instead that players announce mixtures of
their possible actions, but this is an unnecessary complication. Essentially, given infinite riskless
communication, this slight limitation on the flexibility of messages imposes no loss in the long run.
Implicitly, we are assuming that players can understand one another and that they take messages
at face value (not in a strategic sense, but in a linguistic sense). If the message “action L” is sent,
everyone understands that to mean “action L” and not “action R”. Thus, there is a natural language for
speech; the players share enough common history or cultural affiliation that they are able to talk and
understand one another in a previously unencountered situation.
Of course, not all announcements should be considered seriously. We need to define a notion
of credibility or believability. The first requirement is that a player’s announced action should be
self-committing, in the sense that if it were believed and best responded to, the original announcer would
still be willing to carry through with it (within the confines of the action game). This requirement
is equivalent, then, to being in the support of some Nash equilibrium of the action game. At the
beginning of the preplay conversation, any self-committing action is credible, so players have a chance
to guide the discussion. In general, there will be some tradeoff between allowing the players leeway
to influence the conversation at the beginning, but requiring them at some point to pay attention
to what the others are saying and to reflect that updated information in their own announcements.
Unlike in the deterministic best response dynamics of evolutionary models, it is important in this
model that players have a choice over what to say; this is the hallmark of a conversation. It is this
choice, along with the lack of payoffs until the action game is at the very end, that differentiates this
paper’s model from an evolutionary learning model.
The common forecast is very slowly updated by each credible announcement. We can think of the
prior forecast as the result of a long, but finite fictitious history of credible announcements, with each
new stated action adding to the average.7 As beliefs get updated, the initial forecast can be ignored and
only the actual credible announcements counted toward an average forecast: this forecast constitutes a
4 The players do not have beliefs about the full strategies of their opponents, only ideas about what might actually occur in the
game. Thus, the preplay forecasts are distributions over actions, not distributions over mixed strategies (which themselves
are distributions over actions). This is not crucial to the conclusions reached.
5 It is not strictly necessary for the results that the priors be totally mixed.
6 The author performed the analysis under the seemingly weaker assumption that all that is known about the prior forecasts is
that they place a certain minimum weight on each action, but the results carry over. Since this assumption adds complexity,
but is no sounder in justification (Why can the entire distributions not be known if the minimum weights are?), it has been
left out.
7 Recall that the average of multiple sets of actions is equivalent to a mixed strategy.
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player’s appearance. In general, we recursively define an announced action to be credible if it is the
best response (within ε) to either the current forecast of an opponent’s behavior or to an opponent’s
appearance.8 If there are more than two players, either the common updated forecast or a player’s
appearance may be substituted for each. The intuition here is that a player can either say something
like, “This is what I think you are going to do, and if so then I would plan to do such-and-such,”
or something along the lines of, “Okay—for the moment I’ll take you at your face value, and in that
case I’ll want to do so-and-so.” Of course, he or she only needs to consider credible announcements in
making these plans.
At any time during the preplay conversation, a player can make any announcement desired,
but only those statements that are credible will have an impact on the conversation. Since all
players know the prior forecasts and all previous announcements, they can calculate which of these
announcements were actually credible and hence also which of their own announcements will be
perceived as credible by others. If at any point, there is but a single action that is credible for a
particular player, it must be that this player can only seriously be considering that action (at that point
in time). Therefore, in effect, it does not matter whether or not he or she actually announces that
action; everyone knows that it is being considered, and hence, it should count toward the forecast and
appearance of that player, regardless of what may or may not be announced. This argument implies
that without loss of generality, we may assume that all players make credible announcements during
each round of the conversation.9 Finally, we assume that at each point in time, any player can start
over; that is, declare a clean slate and remake their appearance anew. This is the equivalent of declaring
that the conversation has broken down from his or her perspective and, among other implications,
allows the players to attempt to coordinate. Although it may seem like an overly strong possibility,
in fact, a player’s appearance is a powerful commitment device, and so, giving up on it involves a
significant loss.10 In any case, of course, the clean slate option is available equally to all of the players.
This completes the description of the cheap talk conversation.
One last remaining question about the credibility concept concerns the infinite durability of
credible announcements. That is, a credible announcement always “counts” even if it is no longer
credible. The reason for this is that any credible announcement indicates evidence of a desire for
that action if possible, and there is no reason to think that the desire will change or that the desired
action may not once again become plausible. In effect, each announcement has a small impact
that builds toward the whole impression, rather than the fads of currently credible actions. In fact,
if only those actions that are credible at the moment are averaged into the player’s appearance,
at each communication stage, one can observe swings back and forth of what is and is not believable.
Furthermore, in this updated setting, eventually, only one pure strategy will be credible, and so, it is
essentially impossible for players to converge to a mixed strategy.
Once the preplay conversation is complete, we have a countably infinite sequence of
announcements for each player, with an associated sequence of appearances (the average credible
announcement to date). This latter sequence may or may not have a limit.11 Because of the infinite
horizon and the nature of the updating process, if the limit does exist for a given player, then the
forecasts made by the other players about this player will also converge, and to the same point. In this
case, we specify that entering the concrete action game, the beliefs held by the other players about this
player are also this same point in the strategy space. In this way, the conversation is a model of belief
formation. If the appearance does not converge, then the appropriate forecast will not converge either,
8 We assume that players only care about payoffs up to some arbitrarily small constant ε, either because they cannot perceive
finer differences or because they are indifferent over this range.
9 We make the standard assumptions on the action game so that a best response always exists.
10 In particular, continually starting over inhibits convergence, in which case, the player has no influence on the ultimate
course of the discussion. This is never optimal, as shown below.
11 If no credible announcements were made after some finite stage, this is taken to mean that the limit does not exist. However,
as above, we may assume that this does not occur.
Games 2020, 11, 34 6 of 14
and beliefs remain open for the time being. Of course, it may be true in general that appearances have
a limit only for some (possibly empty) subset of the group of players.
If the appearances of all players converge, then we say that the conversation itself converges.
However, in this case, every player continues to make credible announcements, and hence, at the
limit, these announcements must be near the best responses to the actions stated by the other players,
and hence to the limits of the other players. Since by definition, the latter are the beliefs held by
the given player upon entering the action game, his or her limit must be an action that is (near) the
best response to his or her beliefs and is therefore one optimal strategy to pursue in the action game.
Therefore, we may assume that this limit action is indeed chosen, validating the beliefs of the other
players. Of course, since this is true for all players, the limits must be mutual best responses, and thus,
the play arrives at a Nash equilibrium. This is Theorem 1 below.
We next turn our attention to the question of optimality in the cheap talk stage of the overall
game. Stepping back for a moment, we consider the question of whether or not to participate in
the conversation at all, given the opportunity to do so. Since there is a natural language with which
to communicate, any player can initiate a conversation. Whether or not they choose to participate,
other players will hear and be influenced by the announcements of this player. Therefore, if they do
not also make announcements, this player (or players) will have free reign to drive beliefs toward the
equilibrium of their choosing (by announcing it ad infinitum). Since this outcome is at least weakly bad
for other players, it cannot hurt them to also join in the conversation and attempt to guide the discussion
in a direction favorable for them. For instance, in the Battle of the Sexes game, played between one
man and one woman, Player 1 conversing with himself will continuously announce the equilibrium
that he prefers. Entering the action game, the other player believes these announcements and best
responds to them, so that the play will in fact be at that equilibrium. In this case, it would have been
a good idea for Player 2 to at least try to promote her favored outcome, that is to participate in the
conversation. Thus, we may assume, without any loss of generality, that all players converse.
Players do not know the cheap talk strategies employed by their opponents (if they did, we should
instead be modeling what occurred before this conversation in order for that knowledge to be gained),
so these players must consider all strategies to be possible. Thus, if a cheap talk strategy for one player
never performs better (in terms of the payoffs ultimately realized in the action game, of course) than
another competing strategy and does strictly worse against at least one possible strategy profile of
the opponents, then the original strategy should be discarded as suboptimal. Anything that is not
weakly dominated is optimal.12 This is intentionally a broad definition of a strategy; it is meant to be as
loose as possible and yet at least minimally capture the requirements of optimality. Theorem 2 below
proves that if all players employ communication strategies that are optimal in this loose sense, then the
conversation must converge to a stably efficient equilibrium of the game. This class of equilibria,
defined below, is essentially those Nash equilibria for which no coalition can break away and, on their
own, force the other players to follow them to some other equilibrium that is preferred by the coalition.
In two person games with distinct payoffs (a property that holds generically), this result is equivalent
to Pareto optimality.
4. Model
Consider a game G with n players and finite action spaces Si for i = 1, ..., n.13 Payoffs are given by
ui for i = 1, ..., n. It will be simplest to think of G in normal form. G is played exactly once, though G
itself may be a repeated game. Before this happens, there is a conversation C(G), defined as follows.
Each player begins the pregame conversation with a totally mixed prior forecast πi = π1i ∈ ∆(Si)
about his or her behavior. The forecasts are common knowledge among all the players. At each
12 Naturally, since full rationality is assumed, we could endlessly iterate the process, but there is no need.
13 The assumption of finiteness can be weakened.
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round t = 1, 2, 3... of the conversation, player i announces mti ∈ Si. The announcements are made





∆(Si) be the set of Nash equilibria of G, and define Ei ⊆ Si by:
Ei = {si ∈ Si | ∃σ ∈ NE(G) with si ∈ supp(σi)} .
This set constitutes the self-committing actions for player i. At t = 1, any m1i ∈ Ei is said to be





i )/(T + 1)
for some fixed T, which can be chosen to be large relative to the scale of the strategy space and
payoffs in the underlying game. This captures the slow updating process of prior forecasts by credible
announcements. In a similar fashion, the appearance is given by p2i = m
1
i . If the initial announcement
was not credible, then the forecast is not updated, and the appearance is undefined. Recursively,










where εBRi(σ−1) denotes: {
si ∈ Si | max
s′i∈Si
ui(s′i, σ−1)− ui(si, σ−i) < ε
}
for some arbitrarily small ε > 0. If mti is not credible,














i )/(T + t) and p
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Say that player i’s appearance converges if player i never entirely stops making credible
announcements and if lim
t→∞
pti exists. If this happens, it is clear that limt→∞
πti also exists and is the
same; call it bi for the belief about player i. If the limit exists for all players, then the conversation








∆(Si) such that σ = b for some belief
vector b resulting from a convergent conversation starting at some prior forecasts π; the set of acceptable
equilibria is denoted AccE(G).
Theorem 1.
1. NE(G) ⊆ AccE(G)
2. AccE(G) ⊆ εNE(G)
Proof. (1) Let σ ∈ NE(G), and consider prior forecasts π very close to σ. By the definition of a Nash
equilibrium, any si ∈ supp(σi) is in εBRi(π−i). Now, let the players announce actions in the support
14 Sequential announcements lead to a forced asymmetry regarding who speaks when. The effects of this generalized
first-mover advantage are irrelevant for the present discussion.
15 Unless player i has only one possible credible announcement, as discussed in Section 3.
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of σ in such a way as to match as nearly as possible the actual distribution prescribed by σ. Initially,
all these actions will be credible as stated. Of course, the forecasts will change over time, but since
the updating process is slow and the cheap talk announcements are matching the given distribution,
the forecasts will always stay near σ. Hence, the actions in the support of the announcements will
remain credible forever. In this manner, lim
t→∞
pti exists ∀i, and moreover, limt→∞p
t
i = σi. Thus, σ is indeed
an acceptable equilibrium.
(2) If σ ∈ AccE(G) and so is the limit of a convergent conversation, it must be that all si ∈
supp(σi) are credibly announced infinitely often during the preplay cheap talk stage.16 Since in the
limit, both the forecasts and the appearances are arbitrarily near σ, each such si must be in εBRi(σ−1),
and therefore, σi ∈ εBRi(σ−i)∀i.
Among other things, this result justifies the possibility that after a convergent conversation,
players both rationally and self-consistently hold the beliefs that are given by the model. Theorem
1 in some sense clarifies the relationship between cheap talk (as has been modeled here) and Nash
equilibrium. If the communication is meaningful, that is if the cheap talk has a limit, then it must lead
to a Nash outcome. Of course, there is no guarantee that the conversation will converge, and it is quite
possible that it will not.17 Furthermore, no Nash equilibrium, even if inefficient, can yet be ruled out.
Something stronger than an acceptable equilibrium is required.
We next turn to defining the appropriate efficiency concept in this setting.
Definition 2. Call σ ∈ NE(G) directly attainable from σ′ ∈ NE(G) by the coalition S if σs is a Nash
equilibrium in the induced game fixing all players outside of S to play as in σ′, and if also ∀i /∈ S, we have
ui(σi, σS, σ′−i,S) > ui(σ
′
i , σS, σ
′
−i,S).
This is a strenuous definition: the first condition asks that the members of S be able to “jump” to
σ from σ′, and the second condition requires that once they have done so, they can force the rest of the
players to follow them.
Definition 3. Call σ ∈ NE(G) attainable from σ′ ∈ NE(G) by the coalition S if there is a chain of equilibria,
each directly attainable by S, leading from σ′ to σ; if also, ∀i ∈ S ui(σ) > ui(σ′); and if finally, there is no
similar such chain (for any coalition) leading away from σ.
These are once again fairly strict requirements. The second one states that all members of S must
strictly prefer the new equilibrium, and the third states that the new equilibrium itself is immune to
these sorts of deviations.
Definition 4. A Nash equilibrium of G is stably efficient if nothing is attainable from it; the set of these
equilibria is denoted StE f f (G).
By considering the grand coalition of all players, it is clear that an equilibrium exhibiting stable
efficiency will tend to be efficient. In games with distinct payoffs, no singleton coalitions can ever
attain alternate equilibria (this follows from the first condition of the first definition), and hence, in
two-person games, stable efficiency is generically equivalent to efficiency. It is clear that stably efficient
equilibria always exist (since whatever is attained must itself be stably efficient). In most games,
efficiency and stable efficiency will coincide, but when they do not, it is important that we use the
latter concept. Stable efficiency is related to the coalition-proof concept introduced by [21], but is more
16 In particular, since the conversation converges, there must be some round after which nobody ever cleans their slate and
starts over.
17 Consider, as one example, fictitious play in the rock-paper-scissors game.
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farsighted in that it looks at the full implications of a coalitional deviation; it turns out that neither
definition is a refinement of the other.
Recall that a cheap talk strategy is optimal if it is not weakly dominated.




∆(Si) such that σ = b for some belief
vector b resulting from a convergent optimal conversation starting at some prior forecasts π; the set of agreeable
equilibria is denoted AgrE(G).
Theorem 2.
1. StE f f (G) ⊆ AgrE(G)
2. AgrE(G) ⊆ εStE f f (G)
Proof. (1) Consider σ ∈ StE f f (G), and let the prior forecasts π be very close to σ. Since the forecasts
favor σ so heavily, the only way that another equilibrium can ever be reached during the conversation
is if it is directly attainable or the result of a chain of directly attainable equilibria. Thus, all of the
players know that these are the only feasible outcomes, and in fact (see the strategies below), they
can be reached in a conversation. However, since σ is stably efficient, it is not possible for any player
(as a member of any coalition) to be sure that by deviating from one of these alternates, a superior
payoff can be achieved. It must be the case that either not all members of the coalition will profit by
the switch (in which case, those who do not profit will not participate in the deviation) or if they do,
that then, there is another coalition that can profitably and successfully deviate away from this new
point. Of course, it is possible that one’s payoff will be increased by attempting to switch equilibria,
but there will always be circumstances in which it is not profitable. Thus, there is no strategy that
weakly dominates the strategy “emulate σ”, which is always available due to the prior forecasts.
This implies that one optimal strategy for all players is to follow σ, and the result of this will be that
the conversation converges with σ. There may be other optimal strategies, and there may be other
possible results to the conversation; however, this is sufficient to show that σ ∈ AgrE(G), as desired.
(2) Suppose that a conversation is converging toward an equilibrium σ that is not stably efficient
(even up to ε-indifference). If there is just one coalition that can attain a superior equilibrium for
itself, it can pursue the following strategy: (a) Erase its current appearance and start over, and then,
(b) announce the actions that lead to the first equilibrium along the chain. If all members of the coalition
have done likewise, then they will be able to credibly repeat those announcements in the next round,
since these are mutual best responses given the forecasts near σ for the other players. If the other
members have not done this, each individual can start over again and try once more. If eventually
they coordinate, then they can continue to make these announcements indefinitely. At some point,
the forecasts and appearances will then be very close to this new equilibrium, and the only credible
choice for the other players will be to switch to it as well (this follows from the definition of directly
attainable). They can continue in this fashion until the final equilibrium in the chain, where the process
will conclude (by the argument in Part (1) above).
Of course, this attempted deviation will not always work, but it is safe in that either it works
(that is, all members of the coalition coordinate) and a higher payoff is realized or it does not and the
conversation stays at σ instead. Therefore, the deviation strategy weakly dominates the “emulate σ
and stay where you are” strategy. Since this is true for all members of the coalition, optimality implies
that all of them will attempt to force the switch to the preferred attainable equilibrium, and with
probability one they will eventually coordinate (since they always have the opportunity to start over).
Therefore, σ was not in fact an agreeable equilibrium.
Similarly, if there were several coalitions that could attain superior equilibria, each member of each
coalition can start over at each round and attempt to coordinate with his or her coalition. Any player
who is a member of several coalitions or who has a choice between attainable equilibria can randomize
between these possibilities. If the player puts almost all weight on his or her individually preferred
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outcome among all these choices and spreads σ(ε) weight across the others, then this will be ε-optimal,
but will at the same time guarantee that with probability one, coordination takes place at some point.
This weakly dominates “emulate σ” because either the conversation converges to σ anyway (though
this never actually happens with optimality), or another coalition coordinates (which could not be
helped), or one of the attempted coalitions coordinates first (which increases payoffs). Therefore, once
again, no optimal conversation will remain at σ, and thus, it could not have been agreeable.
The intuition behind Part (1) is particularly simple in two player games. In this case, given a
strong prior forecast, either player can insist on the original equilibrium σ for longer than the other
player can credibly hold out against it (by the definition of Nash). Therefore, both players must
optimally be able to get at least their payoff from σ. However, since σ is efficient, this means that both
players get exactly this payoff under any optimal strategies, and thus, staying at σ itself is as good as
anything else. The examples in the next section serve to illustrate the mechanisms behind both the
definitions and the proof of the theorem. It should be pointed out that in most specific cases, very little
of the somewhat complex machinery developed above is necessary or applicable; the process is often
hopefully quite natural and intuitive.
5. Examples
The most obvious example of an equilibrium selection problem is posed by the following
coordination game:
A B
A 2, 2 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
Of the three Nash equilibria in the game, only one is efficient. There is also an inefficient
equilibrium, and this type of coordination problem comes up often in many contexts—including viral
pandemics (see, e.g., Jnawali et al. 2017 [22]). Although in scenarios without communication, it is
possible for (B,B) to occur, Theorem 2 implies that the efficient equilibrium (A, A) is the only possible
outcome after rational nonbinding communication takes place among the players, no matter the prior
forecasts. This is easy to see if either of the forecasts puts significant weight on A. In that case, the
other player can credibly repeatedly announce A as the best response and, in this manner, eventually
force the only credible announcement by either player to be A. Since this yields the highest possible
payoff, it is optimal, and the conversation will converge to A.
If instead the prior forecasts are both heavily skewed toward B, then each player can reason as
follows: “If I announce B, we will be stuck there forever, and I will get a payoff of one. If I announce
A, there is some chance that my opponent will announce B, in which case, we will get stuck, and I
will receive one. However, there is also some chance that my opponent will announce A. If we both
continue to do this, these will remain credible announcements (since they each best respond to the
other’s appearance), and we will converge to the efficient equilibrium, delivering me a payoff of two
instead of zero or one. I can always go back to announcing B and force that equilibrium (or start over
altogether), so there is no risk of ending up at the really inefficient mixed equilibrium. Since there are
no instantaneous payoffs lost from miscoordination along the way, the only possible optimal strategy
is for me to announce A.”
Both players are rational, so they will in fact both announce A at all rounds of the cheap talk
communication, and the conversation will end up converging to the efficient equilibrium. Given that
the forecasts were heavily skewed toward B, it may be a long time before the two players have
truly convinced each other of their intention to play A, but they have all the time in the world and
every reason to make use of it. If we looked instead at the pure coordination game in which (A, A)
also yields payoffs of one to each player, the analysis is slightly changed. If the prior forecasts lean
toward either of the symmetric and efficient pure equilibria, the conversation will converge in that
direction. However, if the priors miscoordinate just right (for example, they are completely uniform
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for both players), it will be necessary for both players to randomize their initial announcement. If they
coordinate at that point, successful convergence follows. If not, they simply clean their slate, start over,
and try again. At some point, they must (that is, with probability one) both choose the same action
(this is why it is necessary to randomize rather than to try to coordinate in some deterministic pattern),
and then, they are done.
A less clear-cut example with a unique efficient equilibrium is found in the following version of
the “stag-hunt” game:
S R
S 5, 5 0, 4
R 4, 0 3, 3
Here, the unique efficient equilibrium involves choosing a risk-dominated action, perhaps making
it more difficult to reach. Allowing communication, however, will afford the players an opportunity to
convince each other that it is safe to play action S. [23] has argued to the contrary that cheap talk may
not help in this game. His reasoning is that since each player would prefer the other to take action S,
they should each attempt to convince the other player to choose it. The way to do this is by claiming
that you yourself are also going to pick S. Therefore, hearing the other player announce S should be
discounted as purely manipulative and ignored.
It seems that Aumann’s argument is not self-evident, at least when there is an unlimited chance
to communicate. Rational players know that they will eventually agree on a Nash equilibrium; there
is zero probability of suckering the other player or miscoordinating. At this point, it comes down to
a choice among equilibria. Knowing this perfectly in advance, if a player announces S, it must be
because he or she is hoping to eventually end up at the efficient equilibrium, that is to end up playing
S. It is, after all, the best response at that point. In any case, the data clearly support the idea that
allowing preplay messages increases the probability of observing the efficient, but risk-dominated
equilibrium; see Charness (2000) and Miller and Moser (2004) [24,25].
We turn our attention next to the Battle of the Sexes, which is not at all a game with
common interests:
F B
F 2, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 2
In this case, it is not immediately obvious that even with communication, efficiency can necessarily
be achieved. If the prior forecasts favor either one of the pure equilibria, then the player who prefers that
equilibrium will be able to credibly “insist” on it, and it will be the ultimate limit of the conversation.
If the forecasts are balanced, however, neither player can be assured of getting his/her preferred
outcome. Insisting on it whenever possible may lead the conversation to converge toward the inefficient
mixed equilibrium, which is worse for both players. Therefore, this strategy is not optimal. If instead,
the players “yield” to the other player with some extremely small probability at each round, this will
always be achieved within ε of any other strategy, and since it always leads to one of the efficient
equilibria, it weakly dominates the strategy by a player that forever insists on getting his or her way.
Thus, under this scenario, the players are behaving optimally and can achieve efficiency with certainty.
As a final example, we turn to games with three players in order to explain some of the added
complexity that arises. First, consider the following game in which the matrix player’s payoffs are
listed last:
L R
U 0, 0, 10 −5,−5, 0
D −5,−5, 0 1, 1,−5
L R
U −2,−2, 0 −5,−5, 0
D −5,−5, 0 −1,−1, 0
A B
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This game has two pure Nash equilibria, namely (U, L, A) and (D, R, B), only the first of which is
efficient. The second equilibrium is directly attainable from the first through a coalition of the row
and column players, but it is not fully attainable because they enjoy a lower payoff in this equilibrium.
Thus, the first equilibrium is stably efficient (and hence, the second, dominated one cannot be) and
will be the result of rational communication. Nevertheless, since the row and column payoffs would
be higher at the intermediate point along the chain fixing the matrix player at A, the original efficient
equilibrium is not coalition-proof. Now, modify the payoffs slightly:
L R
U 2, 2, 10 −5,−5, 0
D −5,−5, 0 1, 1,−5
L R
U −2,−2, 0 −5,−5, 0
D −5,−5, 0 3, 3, 0
A B
Only the equilibrium payoffs have been changed, but the analysis has been affected greatly.
Both pure equilibria are now efficient, but for exactly the reasons outlined above, only the second
one, (D, R, B), is stably efficient and can be the result of cheap talk. On the other hand, the original
equilibrium is now coalition-proof, showing the discrepancy between the two concepts.
One of the (unavoidable) limitations of this model is that it can say nothing about zero-sum
games, except that communication can only converge to a Nash equilibrium. Other games in which
all equilibria are efficient, and so for which Theorem 2 is vacuous, are games with a unique Nash
equilibrium. These include matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors (where many of the convergence
problems of fictitious play show up), and the game-theoretic standby of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Of course, we cannot expect that simple communication would lead to cooperation, a strictly dominated
strategy. We have assumed throughout that there is only a single (though unlimited) chance for the
players to talk for playing a game. If G is a repeated game and the players have a full conversation
between each stage, then optimal speech should lead to efficient outcomes all along the extensive form
game tree, both on and off the equilibrium path. This gives rise to the difficult problem of finding
renegotiation-proof equilibria18.
6. Conclusions
Coordination games of various forms, from actual rendezvous games to super-modular games
and complementarity games, have received increasing attention in the game theory literature.
Most equilibrium selection in such games, however, has been relatively informal, appealing to such
concepts as focal points, initial conditions, or competition (essentially an evolutionary argument).
Cheap talk, meaning costless and nonbinding preplay communication, has presented an intuitively
pleasing method for formally attacking the equilibrium selection problem. The model of conversations
presented here attempts to provide one possible resolution to this question of equilibrium selection,
as well as to the even older question of justifying the Nash equilibrium concept.
The model assumes that players meet for the first time and communicate in order to allay their
uncertainty about the future actions of their opponents. Since they have no knowledge of the cheap
talk strategies used by the other players, we do not look for an actual equilibrium of the extended game.
Instead, we look for all outcomes that could reasonably occur as the result of rational communication
on the part of the players. Messages are defined to be credible in the context of a particular conversation.
If at the end of a conversation, a player has put forward a consistent and credible appearance, this is
assumed to in fact be the other players’ belief about his or her future actions. From this base, it is
proven that meaningful communication (that is, in which there is convergence) must end up at a
Nash equilibrium. This is a partial justification for the Nash concept. It is then proven that optimal
18 See, for example, the survey paper by Bergin and MacLeod (1993) [26].
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communication, meaning that all players make strategic and rational announcements, leads to the
deselection of inefficient equilibria.
A strength of the paper is that it gives a decisive answer to these two issues within the context of
a single model. It also applies to games with more than two players or that do not necessarily exhibit
common interests. There are, however, several qualifications to the model. First, the results do not
prove that convergence must take place, only that if it does, then it takes a certain form. Secondly,
since by no means all applications allow the possibility for preplay communication, this cannot be a
general justification for the Nash concept. Indeed, this also potentially predicts a distinction between
environments where one would expect Nash equilibrium to obtain versus others where one would not
necessarily expect it. Finally, the model does put restrictions on the belief formation process, in that it
requires some very small amount of faith to be put in credible announcements, at least over the long
run. Note that this is not a departure from full rationality; traditional models have simply left this
process unmodeled. There are also a number of possible relevant extensions of this model, notably to
correlated equilibrium and to introducing a stochastic element in the conversation.
Calvin Coolidge once wisely said, “It is better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak
and prove it.” However, that applies only to fools: the moral of this paper is, “It is worse to remain
silent and only be supposed rational than to speak and confirm it.”
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